Sample Collective Agreement Malaysia
(ii) The Parties shall meet by mutual agreement as soon as possible, usually no later than seven (7) days after receipt of the written request of either Party, as often as they deem desirable. They shall keep jointly signed minutes setting out as succinctly as possible the factors and circumstances of the dispute, the positions of each party and the areas or points of agreement or disagreement. IFBWW and IKEA have entered into a joint agreement focusing on working conditions at IKEA suppliers in the wood products sector. This includes both independent suppliers and factories owned by IKEA, the Swedwood Group. This agreement was signed in Geneva on 25 May 1998. Czech Republic: The collective wage only includes agreements with agreed nominal wage changes. Workers in Malaysia are celebrating this week after IKEA-Malaysia signed its first collective agreement with a union. IKANO Pte Ltd, owner and operator of IKEA stores in the Southeast Asian country, signed the contract with the workers` union on December 30. Source: Collective wages: OECD calculations based on TURI and Eurofound data, database on wages, hours of work and collective bargaining disputes for European countries, ABS Cat.
No. 6306.0 Employee income and hours for Australia and StatCan, Employment and Social Development Canada, Key Wage Regulations for Canada. Hourly productivity and real wages: OECD CALCULATIONS based on annual national accounts data. ← 28. In other countries (including France, Italy and Portugal), collective bargaining at company level sometimes plays an important role, but whether because of a strict application of the principle of favour or the practice of the social partners to « block » the content of sectoral agreements, agreements at company level can de facto only improve the standards set at national or sectoral level. Fundamentally, these two-tier structures could still allow for a balance between high coverage, macroeconomic stability and some adjustment margins at the firm level. In fact, the main advantage of such a system is that it does not rely on local representation in small or less productive enterprises. However, Boeri (2014[20]) argues that these schemes « combine the wage rigidity of centralised systems with a lack of consideration of macroeconomic constraints » (Boeri, 2014, p. 17[20]). This may be due to the fact that those who can afford more favourable agreements at company level impose generous working conditions on others by participating in the negotiation of sectoral agreements. However, this could also be due to the lack of an adequate wage coordination system in these countries, which has proven to be the key to macroeconomic flexibility (OECD, 2017[2]). As a rule, an agreement in principle is reached, and at this stage the most complicated details are worked out.
Empirically, two categories of factors may be responsible for the lower dispersion of wages in collective bargaining: differences in the performance of characteristics (technically, coefficients) and inexplicable differences (residues). This issue is discussed here by focusing on the two largest groups of countries for which data are available: the first with seven countries (which have three types of collective bargaining) and the second with nine countries (which have two types: collective bargaining at company level and the absence of a collective agreement). Collective bargaining is the process by which a group of workers bargains « collectively » with the employer. This is typically used to negotiate wages, working conditions, benefits, and other factors related to overall pay and workers` rights. Worker i`s wage is measured per hour, and survey weights are used to better align the sample with the actual labour force. Control variables x i b include models for age, gender, education, firm size, type of contract (permanent or temporary), duration of employment, industry and occupation. Some control variables are not available for some countries. Comparing the estimated coefficients, β ^ for the same variables makes it possible, for example, to examine differences in the gender gap or the education premium between workers covered by collective bargaining and those not bound by collective bargaining. Therefore, the main challenge for social partners and governments is to adapt collective bargaining systems to use them in order to achieve better results in terms of employment, job quality and inclusion, while leaving companies the possibility to adapt the rules to their own situation. The exact nature of this challenge and the way in which it is addressed will vary from country to country and will depend to a large extent on existing national traditions of collective bargaining.
The taxonomy is then reconstructed backwards to 1980, with information on the level of collective bargaining (four levels: central or between central and sectoral collective bargaining; sectoral; between sectoral and company bargaining; At the enterprise level, from the ICTWSS), the degree of organisation by identifying changes in the use of renewals, exemptions, opt-out and the existence of the principle of favourability (as reported in the ICTWSS, complemented by information on policy reforms and key agreements using information from LABREF, Eurofound and available literature) and coordination (defined as strong when coord in ICTWSS assumes values 5 and 431, and otherwise weak or absent and smoothing for one year of blips, i.e. without changes in the COORD variable that occur in a single year). Centralization is associated with lower productivity growth, both for the aggregate factor and for labour productivity – full empirical results are available in Annex 3.C. Productivity growth is higher in high-coverage sectors than in low-coverage sectors when collective bargaining is more decentralized. No association is estimated for wage coordination. The estimate, which is based on sectoral comparisons, does not allow easy conclusions to be drawn about overall productivity growth. Nor does it exclude questions of endogeneity, although it is based only on variation within the country. However, the results suggest that centralized collective bargaining may come at the expense of lower productivity growth, although analysis beyond these empirical studies is needed to further explore the links between bargaining regimes and productivity. Legislation on protection against dismissal: Aggregate indices on the rules on the dismissal of workers on permanent contracts (including additional provisions for collective redundancies) and the use of fixed-term contracts Separate indicators for employment protection EP are taken from the OECD employment protection indicators (www.oecd.org/employment/protection).
Both indicators range from 0 to 6 from lowest to strictest. ← 4. See Hijzen, Martins and Parlevliet (2019[103]) for a detailed comparative analysis of collective bargaining systems in these two countries. In this chapter, new evidence was presented based on a number of data sources (data at the country, sector, company and employee levels) suggesting that collective bargaining in the past has meant a trade-off between inclusiveness and flexibility to some extent. In countries and periods when collective bargaining was not limited (or simply did not exist) to collective bargaining at the enterprise level, wage inequality was lower and employment, including among vulnerable groups, was higher. Wage coordination can also have the advantage of strengthening the resilience of the economy to cyclical downturns (OECD, 2017[2]). However, this chapter and the literature have also shown that more centralised bargaining at sectoral or national level can be at the expense of less flexibility in adjusting wages and working conditions to the commercial conditions of each sector or enterprise, which can have a detrimental effect on productivity. Note: ***, **, *: statistically significant at levels 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The results are based on OLS regressions, including national and annual models, collective bargaining, the protocol of average years of education, the proportion of women and institutional variables: (tax wedge, product market regulation, occupational health and safety legislation (temporary and permanent), minimum wage to median wage ratio and gross replacement rate of unemployment benefits). Data on collective bargaining are available at the employee level for 21 OECD countries. In addition to distinguishing between workers covered by collective bargaining and those who are not, microdata separately identify workers whose wages are primarily determined by a company and not by a sectoral contract.18 This makes it possible to distinguish three levels of bargaining: (i) individual or non-existent collective bargaining; (ii) collective bargaining at company level; and (iii) sectoral collective bargaining. All three coexist in the dataset for seven of the 21 countries; in the others, the two coexist.
Work earnings are defined per hour and include bonuses. As in Section 3.2, dispersion is measured as the ratio of wages in the 9th decile to the 1st decile. The impact on wages also affects the relationship between collective bargaining and productivity growth. Centralized collective bargaining systems tend to be associated with lower productivity growth when agreement coverage is high. This suggests that the lack of flexibility at the firm level characteristic of centralised collective bargaining systems could be at the expense of lower productivity growth […].